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Over the last two decades, the Internet and its 
associated innovations have rapidly altered the way people 
around the world communicate, distribute and access 
information, and live their daily lives. Courts have 
grappled with the legal implications of these changes, often 
struggling with the contours and characterization of the 
technology as well as the application of constitutional 
provisions and principles. Judge M. Margaret McKeown of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
had a close-up view of many of these Internet-era 
innovations and the ways the courts have addressed them. 
In this Article, adapted from her October 2013 Roger L. 
Shidler Lecture at the University of Washington School of 
Law, Judge McKeown offers her retrospective thoughts on 
the ways courts have handled constitutional issues in 
Internet cases. She also discusses some of the challenges 
currently facing courts and legislators alike as the U.S. 
legal system incorporates and accommodates Internet-
based technologies and the societal, commercial, 
governmental, and relational changes they spawn. 
 
* This Article is adapted from the Roger L. Shidler Lecture given at the 
University of Washington School of Law on Oct. 22, 2013. 
** Judge McKeown sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. She thanks Marissa Doran (Yale 2013) and Ray Tolentino (Georgetown 
2012) for their research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Newsweek, circa 1995, predicted that no one would ever “buy 
books and newspapers straight over the Internet” or “tote that 
laptop to the beach.”1 By 2012, Americans were spending billions 
shopping online during the holiday season, and Newsweek had left 
the print business entirely.2 
So much for the reliability of predictions. 
In 1997, the year before I joined the bench, on the eve of the 
initial public offering for Amazon.com, I walked into a federal 
courtroom in New York. Barnes and Noble, hoping to upend 
Amazon, claimed there was no bookstore, no books, no nothing. 
Virtually nothing. The argument reminded me of Gertrude Stein 
who said, “there is no there there.”3 Barnes and Noble was 
challenging Amazon’s claim of being the “Earth’s Biggest 
Bookstore.” It was a time when judges did not have computers, 
were not familiar with the Internet, and e-commerce was just a 
buzzword. But everyone thought they knew what a bookstore was. 
We beat back that skepticism. Now, fifteen years later, I look back 
and query: Has the Internet been a game changer for the bench? 
And more specifically, has the Internet changed how we think 
about the Constitution? 
Today the Internet is ubiquitous. We often forget that it was not 
commercialized until the mid-1990s, and that its intersection with 
the law is a relatively recent development—it has been less than 20 
years. 
In the early days of Internet law, there was the famous debate 
of whether the Internet was different. One judge argued that you 
don’t need special rules and laws for the Internet any more than 
1 Clifford Stoll, The Internet? Bah!: Hype Alert: Why Cyberspace Isn’t, 
and Never Will Be, Nirvana. NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 1995). 
2 Black Friday Billions, COMSCORE (Dec. 1, 2013), 
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2013/12/Black_Friday_Billi
ons_12_Billion_in_Desktop_ECommerce_Spending_Marks_First_BillionDollar
_Online_Shopping_Day_of_the_2013_Holiday_Season; Robert Daniel and 
Keach Hagey, Turning a Page: Newsweek Ends Print Run, THE WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873246 
60404578201432812202750. 
3 GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 298 (1937). 
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you do for horses.4 This approach was adapted, of course, from 
Karl Llewellyn’s view when he was drafting the first UCC 
principles.5 
Being from Wyoming, I know about horses. Over the course of 
time, courts did create the law of the horse,6 just as they have now 
created the law of the Internet or cyberspace. So while the “law of 
the horse” debate is interesting, particularly since we are here in 
the West, I view it as no longer worthwhile. In this Article, I will 
illustrate just how significant the impact of the Internet has been. 
Though building on foundational principles, there is a new frontier. 
The Internet is the modern-day Gold Rush in more ways than 
money. 
Since the 1990s we have all become I-lawyers. It began with 
patent lawyers, known years ago as invention lawyers. Then, 
intellectual property, dubbed IP, came out of the woods. No longer 
was it a nerdy subject, but an interesting and lucrative one. 
Everyone became IP lawyers and then Internet lawyers, and, as 
judges, we have now become I-judges, with our I-pads on the 
bench. 
4 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. 
Chi. L. Forum 207, 214 (1996) (quoting University of Chicago Dean Gerhard 
Casper as saying that the University’s law school did not offer a course in “the 
law of the horse”). 
5 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. 
L. REV. 725, 737-40 (1939). See also, e.g., George Henry Hewitt Oliphant & 
Clement Elphinstone Lloyd, THE LAW OF HORSES: INCLUDING THE LAW OF 
INNKEEPERS, VETERINARY SURGEONS, ETC. 174 (1882); O'Brien v. Miller, 60 
Conn. 214 (1891) (action for personal injury caused by being struck by a team of 
runaway horses at a railroad crossing); Goodsell v. Dunning, 34 Conn. 251, 256 
(1867) (action of trespass for taking the plaintiff’s horse pursuant to a statute 
permitting landowners to impound horses that have strayed onto their land); 
Parker v. State, 1 Ala. App. 244 (Ct. App. 1911) (criminal appeal involving 
defendant charged with “unlawfully engag[ing] in a horse race on a public road 
against the peace and dignity,” id. at 245).  
6 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 214 (arguing “that the best way to 
learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules. Lots 
of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still 
more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians 
give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands 
into a course on ‘The Law of the Horse’ is doomed to be shallow and to miss 
unifying principles.”) 
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With iPad or Surface or other tablet in hand, let me take you on 
a journey of how the judiciary has responded to the constitutional 
challenges of the Internet era. Instead of focusing on intellectual 
property and the Internet—a worthwhile topic where there are 
thousands of cases—I deliberately focus on the Constitution as the 
fulcrum because it offers a stark juxtaposition of the application of 
our cherished foundational principles to new technology. 
In talking with lawyers and scholars, the first reaction is the 
story of a system overwhelmed: by the rapid pace of technological 
changes; by whole areas of doctrine, like the First Amendment, 
that are an uncomfortable fit with the Internet; by legal regimes, 
like jurisdiction, that haven’t yet adapted to technologies that don’t 
play by old rules or respect physical boundaries. And of course, 
there is the old joke about how we judges are too old to possibly 
understand the “Interwebs.” All of those things are true (though I 
hope not about me!). Jurisdiction is cloudy, and certain areas of 
doctrine have, at the very least, some catching up to do.  
But in the middle of that narrative—the “the Internet is 
changing all the rules and the system can’t keep up” approach—
there’s a story that is getting lost: one about institutional stability 




How then, with technology that moves in gigabytes, zettabytes, 
and milliseconds, do the courts—which move cautiously—deal 
with the Internet? It is important to understand how courts view the 
Internet—is it something special or is it “old wine, new bottle”? To 
begin, it is instructive to take a look how the courts historically 
have written about Internet cases: 
The first published appellate opinion to mention the “internet” 
came in 1991, in a Second Circuit case involving criminal 
prosecution for spreading a worm and crashing government and 
university computers. The court wrote that the defendant had 
“released into INTERNET, a national computer network, a 
computer program known as a ‘worm’ that spread and multiplied 
4
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eventually causing computers to . . . ‘crash . . . .’”7 Not even THE 
INTERNET, just “INTERNET.”  
Three years later, there had still been only a few cases.8 But by 
2012, the landscape had changed: the word Internet appeared in 
some 20,000 state and federal cases, and the race was on. The 
Supreme Court first got in on the act in 1996 in a case involving 
cable television—Denver Area Educational Telecommunications 
Consortium v. FCC.9 Although the case was about cable TV, not 
the Internet, in a concurrence Justice Souter presciently noted: 
“[A]s broadcast, cable, and the cybertechnology of the Internet and 
the World Wide Web approach the day of using a common 
receiver, we can hardly assume that standards for judging the 
regulation of one of them will not have immense, but now 
unknown and unknowable, effects on the others.”10 So began the 
Supreme Court’s first reference to the Internet. 
The following year, the Supreme Court directly faced its first 
Internet challenge, interpreting a statute on Internet decency. 
At this stage, in 1997, courts were still grappling with 
definitions and the shape of the box. In Reno v. ACLU,11 the 
Supreme Court described “THE” Internet—the word at least 
received an article—as “an international network of interconnected 
computers that enables millions of people to communicate with 
one another in ‘cyberspace’ and to access vast amounts of 
information from around the world.”12 That description became the 
ubiquitous tag line and is parroted again and again in lower court 
cases.  
Beginning with Justice Souter’s references in the cable TV 
case, it soon became clear that the Court recognized the Internet as 
different and that the details of technology mattered.  
7 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991). 
8 See, e.g., MTV Networks, a Div. of Viacom Intern., Inc. v. Curry, 867 
F.Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (trademark suit against former employee alleging 
that employee used employer’s marks in his Internet site). 
9 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
10 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 776–
77 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). 
11 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 
L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (Stevens, J.). 
12 Id. at 849. 
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The nuances of technology have been significant in the 
evolution of Internet law. More accurately, it should be called the 
evolution of law and facts. Because it is a comfortable form of 
analysis, courts often query through analogies. Is the Internet really 
just the Victorian telegraph or is it like broadcast media, or is it 
something different altogether? The file sharing cases—Betamax, 
Napster, and Grokster13—are good examples. For instance, when 
Sony came along with its Betamax device to record television 
programs, the entertainment industry claimed the sky was falling 
and the movie industry would be wiped out. As we now know, this 
new revenue source would help to keep the industry afloat. What 
impressed the Court was the testimony of Fred Rogers of Mr. 
Rogers’ Neighborhood.14 He said that home taping for 
noncommerical use was a public service; his program reached 3 
million families a day. The Court also detailed the mechanical and 
other capabilities of the machine. 15 So a homespun argument plus 
an explanation of the technology carried the day. Courts are 
concerned not just with the case at hand but with the ripple effect 
of that case on technology not yet understood or created.  
The importance of such details was front and center when the 
Court sent a follow-on appeal in Reno v. ACLU back to the trial 
court: “The factual record does not reflect current technological 
reality—a serious flaw in any case involving the Internet. The 
technology of the Internet evolves at a rapid pace.”16 Justice Scalia 
also underscored this point in Kyllo v. United States, a 2001 case 
involving thermal imaging: “It would be foolish to contend that the 
degree of privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”17  
13 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 L. 
Ed. 2d 781 (2005); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
14 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 445 (citing testimony of Fred Rogers that he had 
no objection to home taping for noncommercial use, and holding that there is no 
contributory copyright infringement where a product may be used for 
“substantial” or “commercially significant noninfringing uses”). 
15 Id.  
16 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004). 
17 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001). 
                                                                                                             
6
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol9/iss3/2
2014] THE INTERNET AND THE CONSTITUTION 141 
Fast forward from the beginning of the millennium to 2010, the 
Supreme Court’s current take on technology might be divined from 
the case of City of Ontario v. Quon.18 There the Court was called 
on to determine whether a California police department violated 
the constitutional rights of an employee when it inspected personal 
text messages sent and received by a city-owned pager. The case 
required familiarity with the technology behind pagers.  
At oral argument, the Justices posed the following questions. 
Can you guess who asked what? 
 
1. “[W]hat is the difference between a pager and e-
mail?” [Chief Justice Roberts]19  
2. “What happens if [an officer] is on the pager and 
sending a message [when other officers are] trying 
to reach him . . . ? Does he . . . get a busy signal?” 
[Chief Justice Roberts]20  
3. “[And if that happens, does he] ha[ve] a 
voicemail saying that your call is very important to 
us; we’ll get back to you?” [Justice Kennedy]21 
3. “Could [the Plaintiff] print these . . . spicy 
conversations out and circulate them among his 
buddies?” [Justice Scalia]22  
  
The point is that technology matters in these Internet cases. 
Despite the emphasis on juries, most often it is a judge, not a jury, 
who shapes the case, whether for constitutional interpretation, 
preliminary injunctions, discovery matters, or appeals.  
 
18 560 U.S. 746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010). 
19 Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 
(2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
1332.pdf, at 29. 
20 Id. at 44. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 49. 
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THE CHANGING JUDICIARY 
 
Not only are the law and technology changing, but the 
judiciary is changing. Let's take a look at who is doing the judging 
and how that has evolved over the years. We know that the age 
range on the Supreme Court today is from 53 to 81. I asked the 
Federal Judicial Center for profiles of the lower courts, and this is 
what I discovered in a 20 year snapshot from 1990-201023: 
The age range of all sitting judges has increased; this includes 
senior judges. The range was from 36 to 94 years old in 1990, and 
the range was from 40 to 102 years old in 2010. Judges may not 
age well, but we last a long time. More significantly, the median 
age of active judges has declined: from 58 years old in 1990 to 50 
years old in 2010. 
Over these years, the number of active judges with B.S. 
degrees has decreased. But most amazingly, the number of active 
federal judges with PhDs has tripled, from two to six judges. The 
point is that few judges have a science or math background—
perhaps that’s why they went to law school instead of MIT—but 
federal judges are getting younger, and over time you will see a 
new generation that grew up on computers. Although we won’t see 
the true generation of Internet babies become federal judges until a 
few years down the road, judges are quick learners and are 
adapting to changing technology. 
Before you despair about the Supreme Court and lower court 
federal judges, who have actually done an excellent job absorbing 
the nuances of the Internet, remember that politicians have been 
infamous for their pronouncements about the Internet. When Al 
Gore claimed to have created the Internet,24 Dan Quayle shot back: 
23 Statistics provided to author by the Federal Judicial Center in October 
2013. 
24 Interview with Vice President Al Gore, CNN Late Edition, Mar. 9, 1999, 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnFJ8cHAlco (“During my 
service in the United States Congress, I took the initiative in creating the 
Internet. I took the initiative in moving forward a whole range of initiatives that 
have proven to be important to our country’s economic growth and 
environmental protection, improvements in our educational system.”). 
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“If Al Gore invented the Internet, I invented spell check.”25 Or you 
might consider what a member of the Senate had to say during a 
debate over amendments to the Telecom Act: “The Internet is not 
something that you just dump something on. It's not a big truck. It's 
a series of tubes. And if you don't understand, those tubes can be 
filled, and if they are filled, when you put your message in, it gets 
in line and it's going to be delayed by anyone that puts into that 
tube enormous amounts of material[.]”26  
 
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE INTERNET AGE 
 
Let me now turn to three areas where the courts have charted 
constitutional frontiers: due process, free speech, and the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 
Jurisdiction and Due Process 
 
I begin with what is admittedly the “mess and confusion” 
arena. To my mind, the most significant change wrought by the 
Internet has been with respect to personal jurisdiction. The 
constitutional principle of due process underlies our jurisprudence 
in this area. But it is an area where the Supreme Court has yet to 
weigh in, despite confusion and conflicts among the lower courts. 
Personal jurisdiction once seemed so easy—the concepts of 
minimum contacts, purposeful availment, and due process make 
sense in a physical world. 
If a cow—or a horse—wandered across the open range on the 
Colorado–Wyoming border and caused an accident, jurisdiction 
25 John Schwartz, Gore Deserves Internet Credit, Some Say, WASHINGTON 
POST Mar. 21, 1999, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/gore032199.htm. In fact, my childhood 
neighbor in Wyoming, Bruce Wampler, claims to have developed “the first 
spelling checker for the PC,” running on a Radio Shack TRS-80. Bruce E. 
Wampler, About, BRUCE WAMPLER’S BLOG, http://www.brucewampler. 
wordpress.com/about. 
26 Michael Socolow, Ted Stevens Wins: The Internet’s Tubes Will Be 
Unclogged, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/ 
2014/01/15/net_neutrality_struck_down_in_a_victory_for_the_late_sen_ted_ste
vens.html. 
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was easy. The same was true if the cow wandered into Canada—no 
question. Jurisdiction was metes and bounds—based on place, 
territory, and almost always physical borders. 
Then came the computer, the web, and the cloud. Courts were 
flummoxed on how to approach the topic and so began the era of 
“interactive” and “passive” websites. 
Adopting a sliding scale of commercial activity and 
interactivity as a benchmark for purposeful availment, a district 
court in Pennsylvania established a foundational framework for 
analysis.27 Under the Zippo sliding scale test, “the likelihood that 
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly 
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that 
an entity conducts over the Internet.”28 At one end of this 
continuum are defendants who do business over the Internet and 
have repeated contacts with the forum state such that personal 
jurisdiction is proper.29 At the other end are defendants whose 
minimal presence on the Internet, such as those who simply post 
information on a website, does not suffice to establish 
jurisdiction.30 And in the middle of these poles are “interactive 
Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host 
computer,” where personal jurisdiction is determined by looking to 
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of 
information that occurs on the site.31  
As is often the case, first may not be right, but it is first, and the 
Zippo test took off like a bolt of lightning.32 The test, however, 
27 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 
1124 (W.D. Penn. 1997). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding 
Zippo test “instructive” in determining “sufficiency of internet contacts under a 
specific jurisdiction analysis”); Gator.com Corp v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 
1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Zippo); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. 
Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713–14 (4th Cir. 2002) (“adopting and 
adapting” the Zippo test); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(drawing on Zippo as guidance “in determining whether the operation of an 
internet site can support the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction”). 
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was not universally accepted33 and has eroded over time, with 
more sophisticated analysis of the Web and the nature of websites 
and e-commerce changing drastically. 
By 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit responded to Zippo, poking a huge hole in its logic. In 
Boschetto v. Hansing,34 a California plaintiff purchased a car from 
a Wisconsin seller via eBay.35 The Ninth Circuit held that personal 
jurisdiction did not exist in California, despite the “interactive” 
nature of the sale, noting that “traditional jurisdictional analyses 
are not upended simply because a case involves technological 
developments that make it easier for parties to reach across state 
lines.”36 
But, being the Hollywood circuit, what applies to cars may not 
apply to celebrities. In Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Technologies, 
Inc.,37 a Florida photo company discovered its photos of pop singer 
Fergie and her actor husband Josh Duhamel were being hosted by 
“celebrity-gossip.net,” an Ohio company.38 Naturally, the company 
sued in the Central District of California.39 The interactive nature 
of the website—it included features like user polls and comment 
fields—did not confer general jurisdiction, such that a non-resident 
defendant intended to “sit down and make itself at home.”40 
However, the court found specific jurisdiction because (1) 
“celebrity-gossip.net” received a “substantial number of hits . . . 
from California residents”; (2) third parties advertised to 
Californians, and (3) the website focused on a California 
industry—the entertainment world.41 Taken together, these data  
 
33 E.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 
1154, 1161 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (declining to adopt Zippo test “as substitute for 
minimum contacts” but acknowledging that “website’s level of interactivity may 
be one component” of jurisdictional analysis). 
34 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008). 
35 Id. at 1014–15. 
36 Id. at 1019. 
37 647 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2011). 
38 Id. at 1221–23. 
39 Id. at 1223. 
40 Id. at 1227 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 Id. at 1230. 
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points indicated that a single targeted transaction may not net 
jurisdiction, but a matrix of transactions might. 
So where does that leave us with Internet jurisdiction? Almost 
nowhere. In some respects, we are approaching universal personal 
jurisdiction depending on how the court characterizes a certain 
website and its effect. In my view, there is no coherent theme in 
jurisdiction cases, and the risk is that we may be heading toward 
nationwide jurisdiction. It becomes a gestalt exercise of lining up 
factors on both sides of the argument and assessing fairness. So let 
me leave you with a few practical observations: 
 
 Predicting Internet jurisdiction is a neither an art nor a 
science—International Shoe42 and Burger King43 are easy 
to recite but difficult to apply. This is an area ripe for 
challenge. 
 Zippo’s bright line test is anything but; it has caused chaos 
and confusion 
 The Supreme Court has not yet considered an Internet 
jurisdiction case. There was hope that its decisions in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,44 and J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,45 might shed some 
light, even though they were not Internet cases.46 The 
closest insight came from Justice Breyer’s comment in his 
concurrence that McIntyre, albeit an international case, 
wasn’t the case to rework personal jurisdiction “without a 
better understanding of the relevant contemporary 
commercial circumstances.”47 
42 Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & 
Placement, 326 U.S. 311, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). 
43 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 
L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). 
44 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).  
45 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  
46 In Goodyear, the Court held that a court may exercise general jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation “to hear any and all claims against [it]” when the 
corporation’s affiliations with the State in which the case is brought “are so 
continuous and systematic as to render [the corporation] essentially at home in 
the forum State.” 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
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 Legislation in other countries makes jurisdiction an even 
dicier proposition. For example, Malaysia’s Computer 
Crimes Act extends outside the geographical borders of 
Malaysia and applies “if, for the offence in question, the 
computer, program or data was in Malaysia or capable of 
being connected to or sent to or used by or with a computer 
in Malaysia at the material time.”48  
Now let me complicate the jurisdiction equation even further. 
For the last ten years, I have taught a class in Paris called 
“International Internet and Intellectual Property.” I need no 
textbook. The course writes itself every year with vast changes in 
technology and the law. Globalization was always a good catch 
phrase. But to my mind, the Internet has made it a reality. In the 
past, doing business overseas took affirmative action—setting up 
an office, getting boots on the ground, advertising to a foreign 
market, etc. With the Internet, which knows no national borders, 
globalization is automatic, not induced or planned.49 A poignant 
McIntyre, decided the same term as Goodyear, the Court addressed the contours 
of specific, rather than general, jurisdiction, and held that a New Jersey State 
court lacked the power to entertain a suit against a British company whose 
marketing and sales efforts failed to show that the company availed itself of the 
New Jersey market. 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion). Building on its 
precedent in Goodyear and McIntyre, the Supreme Court revisited the scope of 
personal jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). In 
Daimler, the Court held that a foreign company with a subsidiary in California 
was not subject to the general jurisdiction of California courts because the 
company’s “slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.” Id. at 
760. Although Daimler, like Goodyear and McIntyre before it, was not an 
Internet case, it explores the outer limits of personal jurisdiction in cases 
implicating global matters.  
47 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
48 Computer Crimes Act of 1997, Act 563, § 9(2) (2006) (Malay.), available 
at http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%2012/Act%20563.pdf. Germany has a 
similar law that holds Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) liable for violations of 
German content laws if those ISPs had knowledge of the illegal content and 
failed to remove or disable access to that content. German Telemedia Act Sec. 
10, available at http://www.cgerli.org. See also Betsy Rosenblatt, Principles of 
Jurisdiction, available at cyber.law.harvard.edu/property99/domain/Betsy.html. 
49 Zack Kertcher & Ainat Margalit, Challenges to Authority, Burdens of 
Legitimization: The Printing Press and the Internet, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 
(2005) (“The Internet is unique in its capability to instantaneously transmit 
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reminder of globalization comes from the Kirtsaeng case, decided 
by the Supreme Court in 2013.50 While the case involved 
copyright—specifically the first sale doctrine for print books 
manufactured outside the United States—a consortium of e-
commerce groups, eBay, and Google argued in an amicus brief that 
unless the first sale doctrine is applied to works created 
internationally, it “will stifle e-Commerce,” including international 
secondary markets.51 That argument would have little practical 
traction but for the geometric expansion of Internet use. 
As Figure 1 on the following page illustrates, usage of the 
Internet has risen dramatically in the past two decades. The 
geometric rise of international use of the Internet has spawned a 
growing judicial docket. 
One emblematic case is La Ligue v. Yahoo!, which spanned 
courts in France and the United States. That case placed the 
globalization of the Internet in stark relief and raised difficult 
questions regarding Internet jurisdiction. For example, what 
happens when the “free speech zone” in the United States “leaks” 
into France? Or, put another way, when do French rulings impact 
the First Amendment rights of a U.S. company’s conduct on the 
Internet?  
 
information across the globe. Information thus sent disregards the national 
territorial borders by which a modern state is identified.”). And even more 
recently, the Supreme Court decided Walden v. Fiore, Slip Op. No. 12-574 (Feb. 
25, 2014), a jurisdiction case involving activity in two different states. At 
argument, several Justices suggested that this was a traditional, old-fashioned 
case, not one that implicated modern technology. In contrast, according to 
Justice Alito, "When you're talking about the internet, you're in a different 
world." Oral Argument Tr. at 45, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-574_9o6b.pdf. Ultimately, in its 
opinion, the Court noted that "this case does not present the very different 
questions whether and how a defendant's virtual 'presence' and conduct translate 
into 'contacts' with a particular State. . . . We leave questions about virtual 
contacts for another day." Walden, Slip Op. 12- 574, at 13 n.9. 
50 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
51 Brief of Amici Curiae eBay Inc., Google, Inc., et al. in support of 
Petitioner, 2012 WL 2861166, at *22–23 (2012). 
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Figure 1: Historical Internet Usage (M. Margaret McKeown)52 
 
The Yahoo! case started in France but ended up in a U.S. court, 
setting up a quintessential meeting of jurisdictional and First 
Amendment issues in the Internet age. La Ligue complained that 
Yahoo! was allowing its online auction service to be used for the 
sale of memorabilia from the Nazi period, contrary to the French 
Criminal Code. This was true. 
The defense rested on the fact that these auctions were 
conducted under the jurisdiction of the United States. Yahoo! also 
claimed that there were no technical means to prevent French 
residents from participating in these auctions, at least without 
significant financial impact and compromising the essence of the 
Internet. Yahoo! noted that its servers were located on U.S. 
territory, that its services were primarily aimed at U.S. residents; 
that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees freedom of speech and expression, and that any attempt 
52 Figure 1 represents statistical data adapted from INTERNET WORLD 
STATS, www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm, and Katherine Zickuhr, Who’s 
not online and why, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, 4, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Offline% 
20adults_092513_PDF.pdf. 
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to enforce a judgment in the United States would therefore fail for 
unconstitutionality. 
Yahoo! lost in the Paris court.53 In fact, the judge recognized 
the significance of the technology and the complexity of the 
competing arguments and called in big-name experts, like Vincent 
Cerf, often referred to as the “Father of the Internet,” who 
established that Yahoo! had filter tools and other means to 
minimize exposure for French residents. Not perfect but doable. In 
tracking down the judge from Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
Paris, Judge Jean Jacques Gomez, who at the time was equivalent 
to a state trial court judge, I learned he had no prior experience in 
intellectual property or Internet law. He was unmoved by the claim 
that the Paris court was not competent to settle the dispute and that 
there were no technological solutions. He later rose to a position on 
the Cour de Cassation, the French Supreme Court, and is now 
retired from the court and serves as a consultant on—you guessed 
it—Internet law. 
Saddled with a French judgment, Yahoo! sought a declaratory 
judgment in federal district court in California, claiming that the 
French order was unenforceable in the United States because it 
violated Yahoo!’s free speech rights under the First Amendment. 
The district court agreed.54 In the end, these colliding values were 
never resolved as the Ninth Circuit disposed of the case in a 
sharply divided decision based on jurisdiction and ripeness.55 It 
takes a Ouija board to divine the jurisdictional analysis in this 
opinion, highlighting that globalization is stretching the boundaries 
of jurisdiction to their constitutional breaking point.  
Although this example involved Nazi emblems, it just as easily 
could have been another of a growing number of suits about 
representations of Muslims, pornography, or other clashes of 
competing values in the global arena. Domestically, these are First 
Amendment issues. Internationally, they are political, cultural, and, 
53 La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., The 
County Court of Paris, No. RG: 00/05308 (2000). 
54 Yahoo, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 
F.Supp.2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
55 Yahoo, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
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at times, legal issues. 
Because of the well-known constraints on extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution, I turn now to the First Amendment 
at home to consider how the Internet free speech cases have played 
out in the past two decades.  
 
The First Amendment and Free Speech 
 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .”56 In 
First Amendment law, the classic dilemma has been to figure out 
how to characterize the Internet. Is it like a park? A sidewalk? Is it 
like a billboard, a telephone, or a cable network? Or is it one grand 
“public forum” that should be subject to little if any government 
regulation? This effort to analogize the digital world to the 
physical world is a theme repeated in many Internet cases. 
Since the early days of the Internet, courts have struggled with 
the challenge of developing a constitutional vocabulary for this 
new medium. Courts draw on analogies and categories embedded 
in our First Amendment lexicon to varying degrees, and there is no 
uniform approach to free speech in the Internet context. Often 
courts undertake the task of developing free speech jurisprudence 
in the Internet context with a heavy dose of caution, unwilling to 
issue broad rulings that may be undermined or outdated by the 
pace of technology. 
The jurisprudence is characterized by incrementalism, in 
contrast to Internet development which is almost cataclysmic. It is 
no wonder that the breadth of communicative possibilities 
introduced by the Internet has been described as “diverse as human 
thought.”57 
Interestingly, that diversity of subject matter is not reflected in 
the cases before our high court. Significantly, the Supreme Court’s 
landmark Internet free speech cases in the past two decades have 
centered on regulations seeking to protect children from 
exploitation and from viewing obscene and indecent material.  
56 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
57 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Over this period—1996–2012—the Supreme Court issued just 
under 1,400 opinions. Of those, only seventeen mention the 
Internet substantively,58 and only seven were actually about the 
Internet.59 For a technology that has been so pervasive in our lives, 
this tiny handful of cases is remarkable. Curiously, the Court has 
addressed such oddities as whether a floating houseboat counts as a 
"vessel" for purposes of maritime law60 but not Internet 
jurisdiction, and has addressed only limited Internet cases in other 
constitutional areas. 
As noted earlier, the foundational case is Reno v. ACLU.61 
Although the Court recognized the well-established “interest in 
protecting children from harmful materials,” the Court struck down 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), a statute 
that sought to protect minors from such harmful material on the 
Internet.62 The Court found unjustified the CDA’s unnecessarily 
58 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 183 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2012); 
Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011); 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 130 S. Ct. 705, 175 L. Ed. 2d 657 (2010); 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. 
Ed. 2d 753 (2010); John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 177 
L. Ed. 2d 493 (2010); Fed. Commc'n Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 173 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2009); Crawford v. Marion 
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 170 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2008); 
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S. 
Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329 (2007); Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005); 
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 159 L. 
Ed. 2d 690 (2004) (Ashcroft II); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 
U.S. 194, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 156 L. Ed. 2d 221 (2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 
123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 535 U.S. 564, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2002) (Ashcroft I); 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 149 L. Ed. 2d 787 (2001); 
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 
2d 874 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. 
Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 135 L. Ed. 2d 888 
(1996). 
59 Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811; Williams, 553 U.S. 285; Brand X, 545 U.S. 967; 
Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. 656; Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194; Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. 
564; Reno, 521 U.S. 844. 
60 Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013). 
61 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
62 Id. at 875. 
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broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. In the Court’s 
view, the Internet presented a unique medium for the exchange of 
ideas and opinions, a medium entitled to the full range of First 
Amendment protections, despite the government’s asserted interest 
in shielding children from obscene and indecent materials.  
The Court concluded that the same free-speech principles that 
protect books, movies, and speeches apply to the Internet as well, 
and that the CDA’s provisions prohibiting transmission of indecent 
communications to minors (the “indecency provisions”) were 
unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.63 But in reaching that 
conclusion, the Court took care to distinguish the Internet from 
other communicative media such as broadcast media. A broadcast 
medium, the Court observed, was more “invasive” in nature, had 
scarce available frequencies at its inception, and had a long history 
of government regulation.64  
Not so for the Internet, which could hardly be considered a 
scarce expressive commodity, was not invasive like radio or 
television, and, given its novelty, had no long history of 
government supervision or regulation. “Each medium of 
expression,” the Court reminded, “may present its own 
problems.”65 Dotted with quaint references like “computer coffee 
shops,” instead of Internet cafes, the less-than-15-year-old case 
almost seems like ancient history.66 
In her partial concurrence, Justice O’Connor, although 
agreeing that certain portions of the CDA were impermissibly 
restrictive of free speech, presented a somewhat different take on 
the Internet: as a space that could be “zoned” through the use of 
certain types of gateway technology.67 While Justice O’Connor 
noted that such technology was not yet prevalent or available to all 
Internet speakers in 1997, she contemplated that “it is possible to 




64 Id. at 868–69. 
65 Id. at 869 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
66 Id. at 850. 
67 Id. at 886 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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identity, making cyberspace more like the physical world, and 
consequently, more amenable to zoning laws.”68 
Congress was unwilling to accept the defeat handed to it in 
Reno,69 so it passed a successor statute, the Child Online 
Protection Act (“COPA”). COPA imposed a fine and 
imprisonment for any commercial posting that was harmful to 
minors.70 After the Third Circuit affirmed in ACLU v. Ashcroft the 
district court’s preliminary injunction of the statute on the ground 
that the reference to “contemporary community standards” in 
relation to harm to minors was overbroad,71 the Supreme Court 
vacated the injunction and sent the case back to the appellate court 
for another round.72 The debate in the divided Court was whether 
the community standards criterion could be applied because of the 
unique characteristics of the Internet. Drawing on precedent, the 
Court in effect said an Internet publisher was no different than a 
traditional publisher—if a publisher wants to be judged only by the 
standards of a particular community, then it should take the simple 
step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target only to that 
community.73 Not so easy with the Internet. 
With that pronouncement, the case went back to the Third 
Circuit, which once again affirmed the district court’s injunction of 
COPA .74 The third time must be a charm as the death knell to the 
statute came after the third trip to the Supreme Court. Drawing on 
an earlier Playboy case involving a content-based restriction 
designed to protect minors, the Court held that the government 
68 Id. at 890.  
69 Congress subsequently amended the CDA to strike the indecency 
provisions found unconstitutional in Reno, keeping intact the obscenity 
provisions that went unchallenged in that case. 521 U.S. at 882–83. While Reno 
was making its way through the federal courts, the CDA’s obscenity provisions 
also faced a First Amendment challenge in the Southern District of New York. 
See Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In 2005, a 
three-judge panel rejected the constitutional challenge, id. at 273, and the 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed without an opinion, 547 U.S. 1015 (2006). 
70 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231). 
71 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 179–81 (3d Cir. 2000). 
72 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 585–86 (2002). 
73 Id. at 582–84. 
74 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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should bear its full constitutional burden of proof on less restrictive 
alternatives, such as filtering.75 In affirming the district court’s 
preliminary injunction, the Court held that the COPA likely 
violated the First Amendment because the measures adopted by 
Congress were not the least restrictive means available to advance 
the government’s interest of preventing minors from accessing 
harmful internet materials.76 Just as significant was the observation 
that by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the record 
was out of date—the ever changing nature of the Internet had 
outstripped the pace of the litigation. 
The denouement came when, on remand, the district court once 
again held the statute unconstitutional—it was both overinclusive 
(covering nonpornographic commercial speech) and 
underinclusive (not covering sexually explicit material originating 
outside the United States). As the Supreme Court warned earlier, 
the statute wasn’t narrowly tailored because Internet filters, which 
were widely available, were a less restrictive means to protect 
children. The Court let the judgment stand. After a saga lasting 
around 13 years and several trips to the Supreme Court, portions of 
the CDA and COPA were dead. 
Apart from the trilogy of CDA/COPA-related Internet cases, 
the other landmark First Amendment case came in 2003, when the 
Supreme Court once again took up the subject of children and the 
Internet in United States v. American Library Association,77 which 
involved a statute called the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(“CIPA”). Under CIPA, public libraries could receive federal 
assistance to obtain Internet access, but only if they installed filters 
to block obscene images or child pornography and prevent minors 
from accessing harmful materials. A plurality of the Court held 
that these conditions did not violate the First Amendment and 
concluded that the traditional and designated public forum analyses 
did not apply to Internet access in public libraries.78 Instead, the 
plurality recognized the government’s broad discretion to make 
content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to make 
75 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 668–70 (2004). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 205–06 (plurality). 
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available to the public. Despite the disagreements among the 
Justices in American Library Association, they all recognized that 
the government had at least a legitimate interest in protecting 
minors from obscene and pornographic material.79 Unlike in Reno, 
however, First Amendment free speech rights yielded to the 
government’s interest in protecting children.  
The common theme among these cases—Reno, Ashcroft, and 
American Library Association—is a focus on children as the 
recipients of Internet information. In other words, these cases 
conceive of youngsters as actors/consumers/users of the Internet. 
But the Court has also addressed Internet free speech cases in 
which children are the objects or targets of the Internet, 
particularly in the child pornography context. In those cases, 
Congressional efforts to protect children, particularly on the 
Internet, have fared more successfully. 
For example, in the 2008 case of United States v. Williams,80 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that 
criminalizes the pandering or solicitation of child pornography in 
certain circumstances. That statute is known as the PROTECT Act: 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of 
Children Today.81 The statute does not specifically address the 
Internet, but it covers conduct occurring on the Web. Williams, 
who had circulated pictures of minor children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct, pleaded guilty to possession and pandering of 
child porn and then challenged the constitutionality of the Act. In 
upholding the statute, Justice Scalia summarized the long history 
of Congress’s struggle to balance efforts to protect children on the 
Internet with First Amendment constraints: 
Child pornography harms and debases the most 
defenseless of our citizens. Both the State and 
Federal Governments have sought to suppress it for 
many years, only to find it proliferating through the 
new medium of the Internet. This Court held 
unconstitutional Congress’s previous attempt to 
79 Id. 
80 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
81 Publ. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
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meet this new threat, and Congress responded with 
a carefully crafted attempt to eliminate the First 
Amendment problems we identified. As far as the 
provision at issue in this case is concerned, that 
effort was successful.82 
Why was the congressional effort successful? Because the statute 
did not criminalize a substantial amount of protected expressive 
activity for adults. 
Looking back on these landmark Internet free speech cases, 
two interesting trends emerge. First, as Justice Scalia recognized, 
there is a dialogue between Congress and the Court negotiating the 
appropriate balance between the interest in protecting children, and 
the equally important interest of protecting our constitutional free 
speech values.83 Second, despite the rapidly evolving nature of the 
Internet, and despite the ubiquity of the Internet in various areas of 
law, from IP and e-commerce to net neutrality, the Court has not 
jumped in whole hog, instead focusing on similar kinds of cases 
(i.e., those involving children and the regulation of obscenity and 
vice) and modifying and revising its jurisprudence as its 
understanding of technology deepens over time. 
While the Supreme Court’s focus has been on speech 
restrictions on adults intended to protect children, the Internet has 
also spawned another line of speech cases in the lower courts, 
involving speech restrictions on children intended to protect both 
the children and the school environment. The notion that 
administrators may regulate speech at school is enshrined in the 
landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, where the Supreme Court held long ago that 
schools may prohibit speech that might reasonably lead school 
authorities “to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities” or that collides “with the rights 
of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”84 That case was 
decided when life was easy and before schoolchildren joined the 
82 Williams, 553 U.S. at 307. 
83 Id.  
84 393 U.S. 503, 508, 514 (1969). 
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nearly 1 billion people on Facebook,85 500 million on Twitter,86 
270 million on WeChat,87 and countless others on Tumblr and 
Instagram. Whatever the courts might say, technology doesn’t 
differentiate between student speech on a cell phone or computer at 
school and speech emanating from a cell phone or computer off 
campus.  
In the wake of school shootings, cyberbullying, and threats of 
disruption at school, school administrators began disciplining 
students for their speech—both on and off campus. One California 
school district even hired a private company, Geo Listening, to 
monitor students’ public posts and communications in an effort to 
prevent harm.88 But what can a school do when a post turns up 
random illegal activity, like drug use? Due in large part to the 
development of Internet and social media, we see a proliferation of 
cases on the extent of a school’s authority to regulate off-campus 
speech. The activities at issue in these cases range from the 
mundane (disqualification of a student from running for class 
secretary because of a misleading blog post about cancellation of 
an upcoming event),89 to the humorous (satire of a principal),90 to 
the hurtful (mocking of a fellow student),91 to the life-threatening 
(planning a violent attack on the school).92 
85 Number of active users at Facebook over the years, YAHOO! NEWS (May 
1, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/number-active-users-facebook-over-
230449748.html. See also Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook: One Billion and 
Counting, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904436354045780361640
27386112. 
86 Richard Holt, Twitter in numbers, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/9945505/Twitter-in-
numbers.html. 
87 Nice little earner, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21594312-can-wechat-become-world-
beating-app-nice-little-earner. 
88 Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/technology/some-
schools-extend-surveillance-of-students-beyond-campus.html?_r=0.  
89 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) 
90 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2013). 
91 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) 
92 Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Take for example a recent case from the Third Circuit, 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District.93 In that case, a high 
school disciplined a student for creating a fake internet profile of 
the principal on MySpace. The student created the profile while at 
his grandmother’s house, logged on to the school district’s website 
to obtain a photograph of the principal, and after creating the 
profile gave access to various other students by adding them as 
friends on the MySpace website. The majority held that the 
student’s speech did not qualify as “on-campus” speech and was 
therefore subject to full First Amendment protections, warning that 
it would “be an unseemly and dangerous precedent . . . to reach 
into a child’s home and control his/her actions there.”94 The 
concurring opinion pointed out just how outdated it is to peg the 
First Amendment and school speech along physical boundaries:  
[W]ireless internet access, smart phones, . . . 
Facebook and stream-of consciousness 
communications via Twitter . . . make[] any effort 
to trace First Amendment boundaries along the 
physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for 
serious problems in our public schools.95 
There is an even more recent example from the Ninth Circuit: 
Wynar v. Douglas County School District.96 In the face of 
escalating, violent, and threatening messages on MySpace, many 
of which included threats to kill people, our court held that “when 
faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may 
take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that 
meets the requirements of Tinker.”97 Some of the student’s 
threatening statements included the following:  
• “and ill probly only kill the people i hate?who 
hate me / then a few random to get the record” 
• [referring to a classmate] “no im shooting her 
93 650 F.3d 205. 
94 Id. at 216. 
95 Id. at 220–21 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
96 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
97 Id. at 1069. 
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boobs off / then paul (hell take a 50rd clip) / 
then i reload and take out everybody else on the 
list / hmm paul should be last that way i can get 
more people before they run away . . .” 
• “ya i thought about ripping someones throat out 
with one. / wow these r weird thoughts... / then 
raping some chicks dead bodies to?” 
• “that stupid kid from vtech. he didnt do shit and 
got a record. i bet i could get 50+ people / and 
not one bullet would be wasted. 
• “i wish then i could kill more people”98 
The court sought to strike “the appropriate balance between 
allowing schools to act to protect their students from credible 
threats of violence while recognizing freedom of expression by 
students.”99 To strike this balance, the court was “reluctant to try 
and craft a one-size-fits-all approach” for the “myriad of 
circumstances involving off-campus speech,” many of which 
involve speech on the Internet.100  
The limits of the First Amendment are also being tested in the 
new frontier of cyberbullying and criminal prosecutions. In 
October 2013, the state of Florida brought felony charges against 
two young girls, ages 12 and 14, for bullying a classmate online 
until she committed suicide, although the charges were ultimately 
dropped.101  
The upshot of 15-plus years of litigation in the free speech 
arena has been a singular judicial focus revolving around efforts to 
protect children from the effects of the Internet—from child 
pornography and child pornographers, ostensibly inappropriate 
materials, cyberbullying, or other threats. In part this has occurred 
because of ready satisfaction of the government action 
98 Id. at 1065–66. 
99 Id. at 1070. 
100 Id. at 1069. 
101 Steve Almasy, Charges dropped in Rebecca Sedwick bullying case, 
CNN (Nov. 21, 2013) 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/20/us/rebecca-sedwick-bullying-death/.  
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requirement—the proliferation of statutes protecting minors and 
speech occurring in the public school forum.  
In focusing on these issues, I don’t mean to discount other 
important areas in which the Internet implicates the First 
Amendment. The net neutrality/Open Internet debate and issues 
related to e-commerce and intellectual property involve important 
issues that courts have considered and continue to consider in the 
First Amendment context. But these issues have yet to reach the 
Supreme Court. In taking a retrospective look at the Constitution 
and the Internet, it is important to benchmark where the Supreme 
Court started the Internet free speech discussion: in the context of 
balancing the urge to protect children against the long-held value 
of free expression. 
This remarkable focus among the courts on issues related to 
children reflects the judiciary’s important role as a stabilizing force 
in a very murky and tempestuous area of law. By drawing upon 
and adapting old metaphors to address new scenarios, courts 
mediate the rapid development of technology in familiar ways. In 
doing so, the judiciary maintains some semblance of order in a 
messy context, acting slowly and deliberately in specific areas of 
law while willing to alter, revise, and renew First Amendment 
principles in the context of a shifting technological world. As 
Justice Souter presciently observed in 1996, “we should be shy 
about saying the final word today about what will be accepted as 
reasonable tomorrow,” particularly “when we know too little to 
risk the finality of precision.”102 In my view, that’s a good 
summary of the story told by the Internet free speech cases. 
 
The Fourth Amendment and Privacy 
 
Leaving the First Amendment, I turn to another volatile 
constitutional subject—privacy. The Internet has challenged 
nothing so profoundly as our understandings of privacy. In 1999, 
Scott McNeeley of Sun Microsystems was quoted as claiming, 
102 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727, 777, 116 S.Ct 2374, 135 L.Ed. 2d 888 (1996) (Souter, 
J., concurring). 
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“You have zero privacy. Get over it.”103 Technology is moving the 
bar on what we consider private information. We share more; 
companies collect more; search engines can aggregate more. 
But the law’s mechanisms for dealing with privacy issues often 
come from statutes and contracts, not the Constitution. Invoking 
the Fourth Amendment requires state action, and many of the most 
challenging privacy issues involve private actors, not the state. In 
large part, the uproar about Google and Facebook data collection 
and use bypasses the Constitution because the government is not 
necessarily involved. That said, the government is involved in a 
vast array of activities that implicate citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
and privacy rights, from search warrants for digital data to 
electronic monitoring and city-sponsored street cameras. 
There has been a virtual explosion of federal criminal statutes 
dealing with computers, child pornography, and Internet fraud—
from the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the Communications 
in Decency Act to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 
Unlawful Internet Gambling Act, etc., and a host of other statutes 
introduced but not passed. Fourth Amendment issues related to the 
reasonableness of searches and seizures often play out in the 
context of these laws.  
As the Williams case showed in the First Amendment context, 
child pornography cases are a treasure trove for insights about 
technology and how courts respond to the digital world. The 
number of federal child pornography offenders sentenced annually 
has increased from approximately 150 in 1996 to approximately 
1,800 in 2011.104 Lack of user sophistication has been no defense, 
and images erased but left on hard drives have led to hard time. 
The question for the courts has been what expectations of 
privacy are reasonable in the face of changing technology—
historically, this technology has included cameras, telephones, 
103 Stephen Mares, Private Lives? Not ours!, PC World (Apr. 18, 2000). 
104 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2012 Booker Report, at 7, 111, available at 
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_ 
Testimony_and_Reports/Booker_Reports/2012_Booker/Part_C11_Child_Porno
graphy_Offenses.pdf (compiling statistics for annual number of child 
pornography production and non-production offenses). 
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beepers, and surveillance airplanes. Before the Internet age, the 
rule was relatively stable. Many forms of surveillance escaped 
from constitutional regulation because they captured information 
that was either voluntarily shared with a third party or observable 
using devices in general public use. Both notions are variants of 
the same idea, namely that people assumed the risk that others 
would see the information they chose to share. Our citizens were 
responsible for anticipating the consequences of their information 
disclosures. 
A bit of history is in order. We have come a long way from 
Olmstead v. United States,105 where the Supreme Court held that a 
telephone wiretap was not a search. That case was overruled by 
Katz v. United States106 in 1967, which established that the privacy 
concerns of electronic surveillance were not beyond the Fourth 
Amendment. Defining the reasonable expectations of privacy 
called for in Katz has proven more difficult. 
In 1983, the Court considered the constitutionality of using an 
electronic surveillance device on a car, which could be tracked for 
short distances. The Court wrote in United States v. Knotts that a 
“person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”107 Likewise, in the “flyover cases,” like Dow 
Chemical, the Court held that surveillance of private property from 
the air was constitutionally permissible because the cameras used 
to conduct that surveillance were “available to the public.”108 
(Those cameras, apropos, cost about $22,000.)109 
Of course, those cases were from the 1980s. By the mid-2000s, 
the range of technologies that were “generally available to the 
public” had exploded. It was becoming possible to use those 
technologies—surveillance cameras, global position satellites 
(GPS), cell tower data, Internet packet data—to aggregate 
hundreds, thousands, or more data points about any particular 
person, and in the process, to get closer and closer to a model of 
105 277 U.S. 438 (1926). 
106 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
107 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
108 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234 (1986). 
109 Id. at 242 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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total surveillance.110 This world, a far cry from the Dow Chemical 
fly-by, was foreshadowed in the movie The Bourne Ultimatum, 
where the CIA tracked a target’s precise movements using location 
data.111  
The evolution of creative technology led to cases like Kyllo, 
which involved a thermal imaging device that could “see through” 
walls from the outside.112 Pushing back against law enforcement, 
the Court held that there are limits on how the government can use 
technologies, even those in public use, because the manner of use 
might reveal too much. Justice Scalia wrote: “The question we 
confront today is what limits there are upon this power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”113 
Technological changes put special pressure on the third party 
doctrine, particularly in the context of Internet surveillance. Early 
in the email and Web era, courts had held that using computer 
surveillance techniques that revealed the addresses of the websites 
a person had visited, or the addresses to or from which a person 
had sent emails, was not a search—or, to use the metaphor from 
paper mail, that people had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
“envelope,” as opposed to “content,” data.114 Federal courts soon 
started to see cases challenging knowing exposure, public use, and 
the third party doctrine and began asking whether these concepts—
each of them drawing on metaphors from physical space or life 
before digital technology—provided sufficient protection in an age 
in which technology made limitless surveillance cheap and easy.115 
110 See, e.g., In re. U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th 
Cir. 2013).  
111 The Bourne Ultimatum, 2007, clip available at 
http://www.anyclip.com/movies/the-bourne-ultimatum/failing-to-track-daniels/. 
112 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
113 Id. 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that an internet user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
identifying information—name, email address, telephone number, physical 
address—provided to an Internet Service Provider). 
115 See, e.g., In re. Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312-13 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (involving cell site location information); United States v. Warshak, 
631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1197 (10th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 645 (2012) (debate between majority and 
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We share information with others all the time, parties were saying, 
but we don’t expect the government to collect and sift through all 
of it.  
It turns out that, in voicing these concerns, parties and the 
courts were echoing an argument that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
made in an article back in 1974. 116 “Suppose,” he wrote, “that the 
local police in a particular jurisdiction were to decide to station a 
police car at the entrance to the parking lots of a well-patronized 
bar from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every day. . . . I would guess that 
the great majority of people . . . would say that this is not a proper 
police function. . . . There would be an uneasiness[.]”117 By the 
2000s, the kind of surveillance that seemed relatively fanciful in 
1974 was cheap and easy, and challenges to surveillance started 
winding their way through the federal courts.118  
Then, in 2012, came United States v. Jones. In Jones, the Court 
held that law enforcement’s installation and use of a physical GPS 
device, which had been attached to the underside of a criminal 
suspect’s car, was a search.119 It was a search, according to Justice 
Scalia (and three others—the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy 
and Thomas), because the act of invading the physical space of the 
car was a trespass to property. It is significant how the court 
distinguished Knotts, where there was “no infringement of Knotts’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained—
the location of the automobile carrying the container on public 
roads, and the location of the off-loaded container in an open field 
dissent over scope of the third-party doctrine). See also United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 957, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
116 William H. Rehnquist, Is An Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent 
with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement: Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long 
Way, Baby, 23 KANSAS L. REV. 1 (1974).  
117 Id. at 9. 
118 See, e.g., Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(considering action against AT&T alleging constitutional and statutory 
violations in connection with AT&T’s alleged participation in the government's 
alleged warrantless surveillance programs, see Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 439 F. 
Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), and remanding to district court in light of the 
FISA Amendments of 2008). 
119  Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
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near Knotts’ cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the 
public.”120 The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has 
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespass test. 
In truth, technology is going to eclipse the narrow holding of 
Jones. The police can already use On*Star and cell phone GPS for 
tracking people, without the need for any physical contact with the 
car. And of course, the government can surveil people in other 
ways, including by monitoring Web traffic or phone or credit card 
records. 
Jones was notable for much more than the trespass holding. 
Four Justices—Alito, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan— 
wrote a concurrence about the privacy implications of surveillance 
technology. Justice Alito characterized the threat in Jones not as an 
invasion of property, as Justice Scalia had, but as an invasion of 
privacy. “In the pre-computer age,” he wrote, “the greatest 
protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but 
practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time 
was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”121 The 
Justices would have asked “whether the use of GPS tracking in a 
particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable 
person would not have anticipated.”122 Here, they said, they would 
have held that a reasonable person would not expect that law 
enforcement would “secretly monitor and catalog every movement 
of an individual’s car for a very long period.”123 This approach 
harkens back to Justice Rehnquist’s argument.  
Justice Sotomayor wrote another particularly illuminating 
concurrence:  
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that 
an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the 
120 Id. at 951. 
121 Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
122 Id. at 964. 
123 Id. 
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course of carrying out mundane tasks. People 
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to 
their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and 
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to 
their Internet service providers; and the books, 
groceries, and medications they purchase to online 
retailers. Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some 
people may find the “tradeoff” of privacy for 
convenience “worthwhile,” or come to accept this 
“diminution of privacy” as “inevitable,” . . . , and 
perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would 
accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure 
to the Government of a list of every Web site they 
had visited in the last week, or month, or year.124 
Together, the Jones concurrences point to the conclusion that 
constitutional law might need a new theory—not just trespass, not 
just “knowing exposure,” not just the third party doctrine, and 
probably not the old Dow Chemical/Kyllo notion that the state can 
use technology so long as it is in “general public use.” Rather, the 
concurrences signaled that constitutional law might need a theory 
more like intrusion: a theory that could reinvigorate the Katz 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test. Just as the technology in 
Kyllo called into question the assumptions of Dow Chemical, the 
technology in Jones calls into question some of the assumptions of 
those earlier cases.  
A year after Jones, the Ninth Circuit considered the case of 
United States v. Cotterman, involving a border search of a person’s 
laptop.125 The question in Cotterman was, as in Kyllo, “what limits 
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of 
guaranteed privacy.”126 
Cotterman came across the border with laptop. Authorities 
detained him, took his laptop for several days for extensive 
forensic analysis, and discovered child pornography. The 
government took the position that no suspicion was needed for the 
124 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
125 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014). 
126 Id. at 956-57. 
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search because it originated at the border. I wrote on behalf of the 
en banc court, explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee 
of people’s right to be secure in their “papers” can encompass the 
right to be secure in records stored in electronic form. Laptops 
contain financial records, confidential business documents, 
medical records, and private emails. They are not just containers.  
Cotterman was a case that, like Jones, challenged the old 
metaphors that courts had been using to address internet issues in 
the Fourth Amendment context. The opinion noted that the 
“amount of private information carried by international travelers 
was traditionally circumscribed by the size of the traveler’s 
luggage or automobile,” but that “is no longer the case,” because 
“[e]lectronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of 
information.”127 The reality of personal digital storage was 
described as follows: 
Laptop computers, iPads and the like are 
simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They 
contain the most intimate details of our lives: 
financial records, confidential business documents, 
medical records and private emails. This type of 
material implicates the Fourth Amendment’s 
specific guarantee of the people’s right to be secure 
in their “papers.”128 
Cotterman poked holes in old metaphors on another level as 
well: the incriminating data that border agents found in 
Cotterman’s laptop was in the “deleted files” section. “It is as if,” 
we said, “a search of a person’s suitcase could reveal not only what 
the bag contained on the current trip, but everything it had ever 
carried.”129 Significantly, “[a] person’s digital life ought not to be 
hijacked simply by crossing a border.”130 
The Recorder, a San Francisco legal newspaper, depicted the 
opinion in the following cartoon showing Chief Judge Kozinski, 
who joined the opinion, and me at the border fence.  
127 Id. at 964.  
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 965. 
130 Id. 
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Figure 2: The Cotterman cartoon (reprinted courtesy of George 
Riemann) 
 
Why do I focus on Jones and Cotterman? Because those cases 
demonstrate, like Katz and Kyllo before them, that the courts have 
been remarkably willing to revise theories and metaphors that no 
longer make sense in the face of changing technology. The new 
reality is that many, if not most, of the daily activities we once 
could perform in relative privacy, from shopping to driving to 
reading, are now activities that, by force of infrastructure, we 
“share” with third parties. 
The punch line on digital privacy is that the courts have just 
begun to plumb the depths of the Fourth Amendment. Our 
conceptions of privacy have changed dramatically since the time of 
Olmstead in the early 1900s. Katz gave us the brilliant “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test. The question now is how the limits of 
that standard will be tested by the Internet.    
Which brings me to my last point: What is on the horizon? 
What are the emerging challenges? 
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Courts are already experiencing a wave of constitutional 
challenges to government surveillance programs. Many of these 
challenges are arising in response to the government’s national 
security and warrantless wiretapping cases, particularly in the 
wake of the 2013 Edward Snowden leaks. Snowden revealed the 
National Security Agency’s (NSA) electronic surveillance program 
PRISM, which, in the words of one writer, made the NSA “the 
virtual landlord of the digital assets of Americans and foreigners 
alike.”131 Earlier efforts to upend such programs have generally 
been blocked. For example, in February 2013, the Supreme Court 
dismissed a case challenging the constitutionality of NSA 
surveillance under the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, holding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not prove that they 
had been wiretapped.132 But that may start to change.133 In October 
2013, the New York Times broke a story saying that the Justice 
Department is “setting up a potential Supreme Court test of 
whether [the warrantless surveillance program] is constitutional by 
notifying a criminal defendant, for the first time, that evidence 
131 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, How the U.S. Uses Technology to Mine 
More Data More Quickly, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/us/revelations-give-look-at-spy-agencys-
wider-reach.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
132 Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, et al. v. Amnesty 
International USA et al., No. 11-1025, Slip Op. at 1 (Feb. 26, 2013).  
133 In fact, following this lecture, there has been a tsunami of suits related 
to the NSA’s surveillance program. Compare Klayman v. Obama, 2013 WL 
6598728 (D.D.C. 2013) (issuing a preliminary injunction requiring the 
government to cease collection of telephone metadata and concluding that the 
plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits 
of their Fourth Amendment claims, id. at 5) with Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Clapper, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding, in a case about the 
NSA’s bulk collection of telephone metadata, that the “collection of 
breathtaking amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment 
does not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search,” id. at *22). 
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against him derived from eavesdropping.”134 It seems that, after 
Snowden, the lid is now off. Companies like Dropbox, Google, and 
LinkedIn have filed briefs in the FISA court requesting permission 
to publish the number of requests the U.S. Government has made 
for their data—information they are not currently permitted to 
release. Senator Ed Markey is making inquiries about the number 
of times cellphone companies have been asked to share data with 
the government, and what data they have shared.135 Two email 
services that were asked to provide data to the government 
“voluntarily” shut down in August rather than provide user data to 
the government.136  
News reports on data collection are illuminating. For example, 
the New York Times headlined that $7 million in federal money 
granted to the city of Oakland, California to thwart terrorist attacks 
has gone to a “police initiative that will collect and analyze reams 
of surveillance data from around town—from gunshot-detection 
sensors in the barrios of East Oakland to license plate readers 
mounted on police cars patrolling the city’s upscale hills.”137 
Chicago has a network of more than 2,200 cameras, and an 
operations center costing $43 million from which to watch the 
feeds they produce.138 The City of Houston is now using drones for 
surveillance.139 The police have made more than 8 million requests  
134 Charlie Savage, Doors May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-
legal-shift-may-open-door-for-challenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html.  
135 Somini Sengupta, Senator Asks Cellphone Carriers: What Exactly Do 
You Share with Government?, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Sept. 12, 2013, 1:57 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/senator-asks-cellphone-carriers-what-
exactly-do-you-share-with-government/?_r=0. 
136 Somini Sengupta, 2 E-Mail Services Shut Down to Protect Customer 
Data, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Aug. 8, 2013, 11:15 PM), http://bits.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2013/08/08/two-providers-of-encrypted-e-mail-shut-down. 
137 Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/ 
technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-cities.html?pagewanted=all. 
138 Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a 
Technological Age?, in THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION, Brookings 
Governance Studies Series (Dec. 8, 2010) (citing Fran Spielman, Feds Give City 
$48 Million in Anti-terrorism Funds, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at 10). 
139 Id. (citing Katie Baker, Houston Police Use Drone Planes, 
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to phone companies to help track individual cellphones using GPS 




Most efforts to respond to the Internet, and especially its 
impact on privacy, have come from legislatures. In the past 15 
years, Congress has passed numerous statutes related to conduct on 
the Internet, from the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998 to the Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act 
of 2008. Many more legislative efforts have come from state 
legislatures. For example, in the same 15-year time period, 
California has enacted dozens of statutes related to the privacy 
implications of the Internet, dealing with subjects ranging from 
public DNA databases to social media profiles of students to voter 
ID information. 
Beyond these legislative fixes, state and federal administrative 
regulations provide yet another, perhaps nimbler, tool to address 
new challenges posed by the Internet. This phenomenon is playing 
out in the net neutrality/Open Internet debate, where much of the 
litigation focuses largely on the validity of the Federal 
Communication Commission’s administrative regulations.141 
 
The Court of Public Opinion 
 
The law has traditionally lagged behind technology. Lawsuits 
take time and money but the Internet offers something the law does 
TRUTHNEWS, http://www.truthnews.us/?p=973). 
140 Id. (citing Justin Elliott, How Easy Is It for the Police to Get GPS Data 
from Your Phone?, TPM MUCKRAKER (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/12/cell_phone_surveillance_
unpacking_the_legal_issues.php). 
141 Following this lecture, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s net 
neutrality rules, known as the Open Internet Order, on the ground that because 
“the Commission has chosen to classify broadband providers in a manner that 
exempts them from treatment as common carriers, the Communications Act 
expressly prohibits the Commission from nonetheless regulating them as such.” 
Verizon v. FCC, — F.3d —, 2014 WL 113946, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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not—a cheap worldwide platform for communication, often 
anonymously. Public opinion may drive private and government 
conduct in ways that courts and legislatures cannot. A classic 
example is the consumer review, often anonymous or ghostwritten, 
on Yelp and other websites. Just this year, after a trial court 
ordered a customer to rewrite a negative review posted on both 
Yelp and Angie’s List about her home contractor, the Virginia 
Supreme Court reversed the order.142 The court noted that the 
contractor had no right to have the review excised, though he could 
pursue a defamation action. 
One of the best things about the Internet has been the 
unregulated proliferation of LOL—laugh out loud—humor. But 
not everyone is laughing. 
As another example of how the Internet can backfire from a 
public relations standpoint, consider the case of Danish/Dutch 
artist Nadia Plesner. Plesner, as part of her “Simple Living” 
campaign, decided to dress-up an emaciated Darfur victim with a 
Louis Vuitton-inspired bag and a Paris Hilton–style accessory dog. 
All of the profits went to charity. However, Louis Vuitton was not 
amused by the artist’s creative expression, and filed a lawsuit 
against her.143 After a French court ruled against Plesner, she 
agreed to remove the offending references to Louis Vuitton.144 
Yet despite Plesner's promise, she later exhibited a painting 
called “Darfurnica”—a modern day adaptation of Picasso's 
Guernica—which included the illustration of the Simple Living 
boy carrying what appeared to be a Louis Vuitton bag. This 
exhibition prompted an ex parte order against Plesner from a Dutch 
court.145  
Plesner received broad public support. An anonymous group 
launched “Operation Skankbag,” an effort to damage Louis 
142  Perez v. Dietz Development, LLC, 2012 WL 6761997 (S. Ct. Va. 
2012).  
143 District Court of the Hague, May 4, 2011, 389526/KG ZA 11-294  
(Plesner / Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), available at 
http://www.mediareport.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/english-translation-
plesner-vs-louis-vuitton-judgement-4-may-2011.pdf (unofficial translation). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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Vuitton by “buying replica Louis Vuitton handbags, and giving 
them away to homeless people.”146 The Dutch court later quashed 
the ex parte order with retroactive effect, characterizing Plesner’s 
use of the Simple Living image as a “lawful statement” of her 
artistic opinion.147 In an ironic twist, the Dutch court ordered Louis 
Vuitton to pay Plesner's legal costs.148  
These are just a few examples of what happens when the 
Internet intersects with the court of public opinion as well as the 




The Constitution and the Internet share something fundamental 
in their foundations. The framers of the Constitution created a 
blueprint for a system of decentralized governance, organized 
around a set of unifying principles, a system that could evolve over 
time as the nation debated what it should become. In much the 
same way, ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers, revolutionized the world of telecommunications by 
creating a blueprint for a decentralized network united by common 
organizing principles and the uniform system we call “code.”149 
These innovations—this early foundation—enabled decentralized 
groups of engineers to work together to correct system errors, 
through groups like the Internet Engineering Task Force, and to 
meet new challenges. 
The complexity of these challenges and the pace of change in 
the technological realm have been staggering, and many have 
wondered how a centuries-old and tradition-bound legal system 
could possibly keep up. In my view, the answer is that the 
mechanisms that give the Internet its vitality and its capacity to 
pursue ordered evolution are the very same kinds of building 
blocks that give the courts the ability to respond to that change. 
The courts have been willing to question the ways we 
146 See Image: Operation Skankbag, http://i.imgur.com/OpJaw.png (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
147 Plesner, 389526/KG ZA 11-294. 
148 Id. 
149 ICANN coordinates the Internet’s system of unique identifiers.  
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understand new technology, by asking, for instance, whether the 
Internet is “physical space,” whether computers are “containers,” 
whether emails are “papers,” and whether citizens have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in aggregate “envelope” data. That 
evolution—responsive both to established principles and new 
realities—speaks to the endurance and competence of the courts. 
This leads me to believe that, however far we are from a 
bulletproof unified theory of the Constitution and the Internet, 
there is, in the midst of the rapid change, an institution that works. 
Slowly, yes; cautiously, yes. But the sky isn’t falling, and that’s in 
part because the institution of the judiciary—the great meeting-
place of scholars, lawyers, parties, jurors, and judges—is doing 
what it has done in the face of other waves of change: respect 
tradition, but listen, deliberate, and adapt. The challenges posed by 
the intersection of the Internet and the Constitution are not easy 
ones. But they are challenges and tensions for a free society to sort 
out over time. 
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